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WHAT IS ORIGINALISM GOOD FOR? 
John W. Compton* 
JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION (2013). Pp. 312. Hardcover $ 39.95.  
 
FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013). Pp. 240. Hardcover 
$ 45.00.  
 
MARK A. GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
(2013). Pp. 292. Hardcover $ 29.00.  
 
There was a time when the stakes of the debate between originalists and their critics 
seemed relatively clear. In the wake of the rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, early 
originalists, including Robert Bork and Edwin Meese, argued that binding judges to the 
mast of original meaning (or original intent) would ensure a more deferential judiciary. 
Their opponents, who tended to be on the left of the political spectrum, viewed the judici-
ary as a force for social progress. The chief problem with originalism, from this perspec-
tive, was that it required the present generation to submit to the dead hand of the past, with 
all of the tragic social consequences this entailed. Although these claims were contestable, 
both sides seemed to agree on the tradeoffs their respective positions entailed. The Con-
stitution could be understood as an impediment to judicial activism or as a tool for achiev-
ing social justice; it could not be both things at once. 
To the casual observer, it may seem that the battle lines remain more or less where 
they were in the 1980s. But two new studies – one by John O. McGinnis and Michael B. 
Rappaport, the other by Frank B. Cross – make clear just how much the debate has changed 
since the days when Bork and Meese were at the forefront of the originalist movement.1 
McGinnis and Rappaport are originalists who refuse to concede the force of the “dead 
hand” argument.2 Originalism, they argue, does not impose insuperable barriers to consti-
tutional change; properly understood, it is the only interpretive theory that empowers the 
present generation to translate its values into fundamental law.3 Cross, a critic of original-
ism, launches a frontal assault on the idea that originalism exerts a constraining effect on 
                                                          
 * Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Chapman University.   
 1. JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013); 
FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013). 
 2. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 8.  
 3. Id. at 12-13. 
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the judiciary.4 Indeed, he makes a strong case that originalism offers only the appearance 
of constraint, while leaving judges relatively free to read their policy preferences and ide-
ological biases into the text of the Constitution.5 
So where does this leave us? The final book reviewed in this essay, Mark Graber’s 
A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism, provides an indispensable guide to the 
reconfigured landscape of American constitutional theory.6 Although Graber does not 
have a horse in the originalism race, he argues persuasively that the debate between 
originalists and their critics has reached a point of diminishing returns.7 He urges consti-
tutional theorists to move beyond the study of interpretative methods and judicial review 
to consider other, arguably more fundamental sources of constitutional legitimacy, includ-
ing social norms and “constitutional politics” – or the interplay of political institutions that 
are set in motion by constitutional texts but which often evolve in directions not anticipated 
by their designers.8 Americans have always disagreed about the best way of reading their 
Constitution, he points out.9 The more urgent question is how such disagreement is pro-
cessed by the larger constitutional order. 
I. 
At its core, the argument of McGinnis and Rappaport’s Originalism and the Good 
Constitution consists of two interrelated claims.10 The first is that supermajoritarian deci-
sion rules are the most reliable way of arriving at socially beneficial constitutional provi-
sions.11 The second is that the benefits of supermajoritarian provisions will be lost if con-
stitutional interpreters are permitted to depart from the “original meaning” of said 
provisions.12 The first prong of the argument is developed in the book’s first three chapters, 
where the authors explore various theoretical benefits of supermajoritarian decision 
rules.13 They conclude that constitutions adopted under supermajoritarian rules are com-
paratively more likely to protect minority rights and to be viewed as legitimate by the 
wider public.14 In addition, because supermajoritarian procedures make it difficult to alter 
constitutional provisions once they are adopted – and because it is hard to predict how one 
will be affected by a constitutional provision far into the future – such procedures tend to 
discourage key actors from seeking short-term advantages at the expense of long-term so-
cial welfare.15 Supermajoritarian procedures, in short, offer the surest route to “a structure 
of government that preserves democratic decision making [and] individual rights.”16 
But what does supermajoritarianism have to do with originalism? If we accept that 
                                                          
 4. CROSS, supra note 1, at 1-23.  
 5. Id. 
 6. MARK GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2013).  
 7. Id. at 68. 
 8. Id. at 1-3. 
 9. Id. at 1-10. 
 10. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 11-13. 
 11. Id. at 11. 
 12. Id. at 11-13. 
 13. Id. at 1-33. 
 14. Id. at. 42-44. 
 15.  Id. at 54. 
 16.  Id. at 11. 
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supermajoritarian procedures are the best way of arriving at beneficial constitutional pro-
visions, McGinnis and Rappaport argue, we should demand that those tasked with inter-
preting our supermajoritarian Constitution respect the document’s “original meaning.”17 
After all, a judge who deviates from original meaning is in effect substituting a new rule 
for one originally adopted by a supermajority. And because the new rule was not adopted 
through a supermajoritarian procedure, it is unlikely to be better – and may well be worse 
– than the one it replaces.18 Even when a particular constitutional provision no longer pro-
motes the common good, therefore, we would be unwise to trust judges with the task of 
“updating” its meaning. Rather, the logical course of action in such cases is to formally 
amend the text through one of the supermajoritarian procedures spelled out in Article V.19 
The authors acknowledge that the constitution-making process in the United States has not 
always conformed to the theoretical ideal of supermajoritarianism.20 Still, they contend 
that the U.S. Constitution was produced “in the main under appropriate supermajority 
rules, and [that] the norms entrenched in the Constitution [therefore] tend to be desira-
ble.”21 
Having sketched a “welfare consequentialist” case for originalism, McGinnis and 
Rappaport turn from theory to practice.22 How, exactly, should interpreters discover the 
“original meaning” of constitutional provisions? Where most originalists focus on the 
“original intent” or “original public understanding” of particular provisions, McGinnis and 
Rappaport put forward a new approach, which they label “original methods originalism.”23 
The idea, in brief, is that constitutional provisions should be interpreted using the interpre-
tive canons that were in widespread use at the time of their adoption.24 More controver-
sially—and in contrast to prominent originalists including Keith Whittington, Randy Bar-
nett, and Lawrence Solum—McGinnis and Rappaport reject the view that interpreters may 
legitimately appeal to extra-textual considerations when confronted with vagueness, am-
biguity, or constitutional silence. In other words, they deny the legitimacy of what has 
come to be known as “constitutional construction.”25 Indeed, they question whether it is 
ever really the case that original meaning “runs out,” or fails to provide sufficient resources 
for resolving vagueness or ambiguity.26 Even when there are good arguments on both sides 
of a constitutional question, they contend, the interpreter can usually resolve the issue by 
weighing “the relevant originalist evidence . . . and select[ing] the interpretation that [is] 
supported more strongly by that evidence.”27 The authors’ conception of original meaning 
                                                          
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 85-88. 
 19. Id. at 88-94. 
 20. Id. at 11-13. 
 21. Id. at 11. 
 22. Id. at 19. 
 23. Id. at 14, 121. 
 24. Id. at 118, 129. They argue that evidence regarding Founding-era interpretive canons can be derived from 
three sources: “rules that applied to all legal documents, rules that applied to state constitutions, and rules that 
applied to statutes.” Id. 
 25. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
MEANING (1999); RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
(2004); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
 26. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 141. 
 27. Id. at 142. 
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is further narrowed by their insistence that constitutional provisions are never to be under-
stood as embodying “abstract principles that confer significant discretion on future deci-
sion makers.”28 Because constitutions are meant to constrain official authority, they argue, 
it would make little sense for their framers to include principles so abstract that their future 
applications cannot be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty.29 
As we shall see, McGinnis and Rappaport’s unusually narrow conception of “origi-
nal meaning” is not easily reconciled with their welfare-consequentialism.30 But first a 
word on the book’s attributes. McGinnis and Rappaport have clearly thought deeply about 
the central problems of constitutional interpretation, and they have produced an innovative 
work that deserves to be taken seriously by constitutional theorists of all stripes. The ar-
gument that originalism must ultimately stand or fall based on its present-day conse-
quences is both novel and provocative. Consequentialism, after all, has traditionally been 
a key weapon in the arsenal of originalism’s critics (one thinks of FDR imploring the 
Hughes Court to update a Constitution drafted in the “horse-and-buggy age” so as to meet 
the economic needs of “present-day civilization,” or of Justice Brennan upbraiding 
Reagan-era originalists for ignoring the social “consequences [that] flow from a justice’s 
interpretation in a direct and immediate way”).31 In contrast, originalists have tended to 
reject consequentialist reasoning in favor of appeals to abstract principles such as popular 
sovereignty or the rule of law. But as McGinnis and Rappaport point out, there are serious 
holes in the existing normative defenses of originalism.32 The popular sovereignty argu-
ment is vulnerable to the charge that the original document was drafted and ratified by a 
relatively small slice of the Founding-era public. Justifications based on the rule of law are 
vulnerable to the rebuttal that it is possible to be bound by law – in the form of precedent, 
for example – without being bound by the original meaning (however defined) of the text. 
Even if these objections are far from fatal, McGinnis and Rappaport make a strong case 
that they are sufficiently damaging as to necessitate a course correction. The most con-
vincing justification for originalism, they argue, is not that it advances a particular, con-
testable principle, but that “it promotes constitutional interpretations that are likely to have 
better consequences today than those of nonoriginalist theories.”33 
But is this last statement true? Does strict adherence to “original meaning” yield 
social consequences that are superior to those generated by non-originalist or pluralist ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation? This is the point on which the argument hinges, 
and here McGinnis and Rappaport are ultimately unpersuasive. The problem, in short, is 
that the authors’ consequentialism, when combined with their unusually strict conception 
of “original meaning,” leads to the untenable assertion that virtually every departure from 
original meaning (as they define it) has left American society worse off than the alternative 
of adhering to original meaning.34 Recall that the interpreter, in McGinnis and Rappaport’s 
                                                          
 28. Id. at 84-85. 
 29. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 27-28 (2011) (providing a critique of this argument). 
 30. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 24. 
 31. Transcript of May 31, 1935 Press Conference by President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, available at 
http://newdeal.feri.org/court/fdr5_31_35.htm; JUDGES ON JUDGING 213 (David M. O’Brien ed., 3d ed. 2013) 
(quoting Brennan, J.). 
 32. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 3-7. 
 33. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 34. Id. at 118. 
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account, has essentially two choices: she may remain faithful to the original meaning of 
the text, or she may “update” the text in an effort to meet the needs of contemporary soci-
ety.35 The problem with “judicial updating,” on this view, is that judges are ill suited to the 
task of amending the nation’s fundamental law—or at least not as well suited as Article V 
actors. But as even casual students of American constitutional development are aware, 
history is replete with examples of judicial updating that seem to have left American soci-
ety, on the whole, better off. If judicial updating was at least partly responsible for ending 
or mitigating such evils as Jim Crow, child labor, gender discrimination, and anti-sodomy 
laws, shouldn’t this count as evidence that judges are, in fact, perfectly capable of altering 
constitutional meaning in ways that improve the wellbeing of the community? Is it not true 
that, in each of these cases, strict fidelity to original meaning (narrowly defined) would 
have produced more human suffering than the alternative? 
Faced with apparently beneficial instances of judicial updating, McGinnis and Rap-
paport have essentially three options. First, they might deny that the “update” in question 
was, in fact, beneficial to American society. Second, they might argue that all or some of 
these instances have been wrongly characterized as departures from original meaning. 
Third, they might argue that, although judicial updating has at times yielded beneficial 
social consequences, pursuing the constitutional change in question through an Article V 
amendment would have left society better off in the end. For obvious reasons, they mostly 
stick to the last two arguments: We are told that apparent instances of “updating” in fact 
marked a return to first principles, or else that the “update” in question could easily have 
been obtained via Article V, thus avoiding various negative side effects of “judicial activ-
ism.”36 But these claims are for the most part simply asserted. Where one would expect to 
find serious engagement with historical sources, McGinnis and Rappaport offer little more 
than sporadic citations to the literature and dubious counterfactuals. 
When discussing civil rights, for example, they concede that the Warren Court’s 
landmark decisions, most of which were framed in nonoriginalist terms, helped to bring 
the Jim Crow era to an end. And yet they contend that decisions such as Brown v. Board 
of Education were necessary only because an earlier generation had departed from the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment – an amendment that “encapsulated” the 
legacy of John Bingham and the Radical Republicans, and thus should have been under-
stood to bar all forms of racial segregation, including segregated schools.37 This charac-
terization of the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning is not without prominent de-
fenders, to be sure. But the view that the Amendment was widely understood, at the time 
of its adoption, to prohibit segregated schools remains a minority position in the scholarly 
community, and McGinnis and Rappaport offer no new evidence to suggest that the pre-
vailing view is mistaken.38 
                                                          
 35. Id. at 81-90. 
 36. Id. at 93. 
 37. Id. at 111. 
 38. See e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 
(1995) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood to forbid segregated schooling); but 
see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 
81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood to permit seg-
regated schooling).  
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As a fallback position, they claim that, even if educational segregation was not 
among the forms of discrimination originally understood to be proscribed by the Four-
teenth Amendment, meaningful federal enforcement efforts on behalf of African American 
political and economic rights would have rendered decisions such as Brown unnecessary. 
Given a modicum of federal help, African Americans would have used their “greater eco-
nomic and voting power” to press for integration; and Southern whites, in turn, would have 
in time realized that the region’s racial caste system was “not . . . in their economic and 
personal interest.”39 But here again, the authors’ counterfactual scenario finds little support 
in the historical literature. As Michael Klarman has pointed out, segregated schooling was 
universal in the postbellum South, even during the period of vigorous federal enforcement 
of voting rights.40 Nor is there much reason to believe that market forces would have seri-
ously dented the South’s racial caste system, absent the federal enforcement efforts that 
followed in the wake of the Warren Court’s “updating” of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Indeed, as the economic historian Gavin Wright shows in his masterful new study of the 
civil rights-era Southern economy, economic rationality was perfectly compatible with 
racism, as most Southern whites were genuinely convinced that racial segregation worked 
to their economic advantage.41 
When confronted with patently non-originalist decisions that seem to have benefited 
American society, McGinnis and Rappaport consistently take the position that the consti-
tutional change in question could have been achieved via Article V, if only shortsighted 
judges and politicians had not short-circuited the amendment process. In the case of the 
New Deal Court’s expansion of the federal commerce power – which, among other things, 
facilitated the abolition of child labor – they argue that the Roosevelt Administration could 
have won ratification of the Child Labor Amendment, and perhaps of a broader amend-
ment expanding Congress’s commerce power, if only FDR had made the effort. Instead, 
FDR, who was “unwilling to compromise” on the substance of potential amendments, 
pressured the Supreme Court to rewrite the Commerce Clause, with the result that the 
constitutional changes of the New Deal period were deprived of a firm foundation in the 
text.42 
A similar argument is used to dismiss the Burger Court’s landmark decisions on 
gender discrimination. Although McGinnis and Rappaport concede that the original mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit gender discrimination, they insist that 
this problem, too, could easily have been remedied via a constitutional amendment. The 
Equal Rights Amendment came within three states of ratification, after all, and McGinnis 
and Rappaport argue that the Burger Court’s efforts on behalf of gender equality caused 
                                                          
 39. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 109-11, 239 n.15. 
 40. Klarman, supra note 38, at 1891-92 (1995) (“[S]chool segregation was essentially universal in the post-
bellum period,” even in states where black voting majorities existed and where state constitutions “explicitly 
barred the practice.”). 
 41. GAVIN WRIGHT, SHARING THE PRIZE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN THE 
AMERICAN SOUTH 65 (2013). As Wright explains, “[t]he vast majority of [early-twentieth-century] white south-
erners had a vision of economic progress in which blacks had no more than a subordinate role, if any.” Id. In 
fairness to McGinnis and Rappaport, they may not have had access to Wright’s recently published study. 
 42. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 90-91. 
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many state legislators to “conclude that a formal amendment was unnecessary.”43 Moreo-
ver, they contend that the Court’s non-originalist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment 
lent credibility to the arguments of the ERA’s foes, who claimed that activist judges would 
use the amendment to effect sweeping social change – for example, by mandating same-
sex bathrooms and forcing women into combat.44 In sum, although the non-originalist de-
cisions of the Hughes and Burger Courts were well intentioned, their most important con-
sequences were negative: they sapped public enthusiasm for the Article V process and 
deprived arguably necessary constitutional “updates” of the popular legitimacy that would 
have accompanied a formal amendment. Theorists who justify “judicial updating” on the 
grounds that Article V sets an impossible bar to ratification thus “have the matter back-
ward.”45 “It is not that the constitutional amendment process operates poorly and therefore 
nonoriginalism is required. Rather, it is that nonoriginalism prevents the constitutional 
amendment process from operating effectively.”46 
The problem, as in their discussion of civil rights, is that the argument depends on a 
series of complex counterfactuals for which McGinnis and Rappaport provide almost no 
evidence. Could FDR have secured a constitutional amendment overturning the Court’s 
narrow, pre-1937 understanding of the interstate commerce power? Despite McGinnis and 
Rappaport’s claims to the contrary, scholars are divided on the question of whether “the 
requisite supermajorities were in place” for an amendment expanding Congress’s com-
merce power.47 It is important to recall that the Child Labor Amendment had been lan-
guishing in the states since 1924, and aside from Arkansas, not a single Southern state had 
ratified it. In light of the South’s monolithic opposition to this single-issue amendment, it 
seems undeniable that a broader amendment expanding federal power over the economy 
would have faced even greater obstacles.48 And the notion that the Burger Court single-
handedly killed the Equal Rights Amendment is similarly implausible. Even if decisions 
such as Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v. Richardson did, in fact, lower the stakes of the ERA 
fight, it does not follow that the amendment would have been ratified in their absence.49 
For starters, it is important to note that opposition to the ERA was centered in the South 
and a handful of religiously conservative Western states. Was it judicial “activism” that 
drove legislators in these states to oppose the amendment? This seems unlikely. Prominent 
opponents of the ERA, including Senator Sam Ervin and the activist Phillis Schlafly, were 
stoking fears of same-sex bathrooms and women in combat even before the Court entered 
                                                          
 43. Id. at 93. 
 44. Id. 
    45    Id. at 94. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See generally Barry Cushman, Court-Packing and Compromise, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 3-4 (2013); 
JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 154-57 (2010); Gerald N. 
Magliocca, Court-Packing and the Child Labor Amendment, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 476-77 (2011) (specu-
lating that FDR may have hoped to benefit from the failure of the Child Labor Amendment, as this would 
strengthen his hand in the Court-packing fight). Even if we accept this point, however, it also seems clear, based 
on Roosevelt’s private correspondence, that FDR sincerely believed that securing a formal amendment was po-
litically impossible due to Southern opposition. 
 48. Cushman, supra note 47, at 3. Cushman notes that Roosevelt abandoned the amendment idea only after 
“[t]wo years of effort by Justice Department lawyers . . . failed to yield an [amendment] proposal[]” that seemed 
likely to win ratification. Id. 
 49. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
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the gender discrimination fray.50 Jane Mansbridge, who in 1980 interviewed dozens of 
state legislators on the subject of the ERA, reports that only a single lawmaker mentioned 
the Supreme Court as influencing his or her position.51 Would lawmakers in conservative 
states have been under significantly greater pressure to ratify the ERA, absent the Burger 
Court’s updating of the Equal Protection Clause? This assumes that voters in the Deep 
South and conservative Western states viewed gender discrimination as a serious policy 
problem requiring a federal response—and it is far from clear that this was the case. In-
deed, at least in the South, opposition to the ERA was clearly rooted in resentment of the 
federal government’s recent efforts on behalf of African American civil rights. With the 
memory of forced racial integration still fresh in white Southern minds, there was, to put 
it mildly, little enthusiasm for inviting federal intervention on behalf of gender equality.52 
As these examples suggest, Originalism and the Good Constitution suffers from the 
authors’ reluctance to deal seriously with the sorts of tragic choices that a narrow concep-
tion of “original meaning” necessarily entails. Indeed, some inconvenient cases, such as 
the Court’s landmark 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, are ignored altogether.53 Recall 
that the Lawrence Court read the Fourteenth Amendment to bar states from criminalizing 
sodomy between consenting adults—an interpretation that is almost certainly at odds with 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s understanding of original meaning. Presumably, they would 
condemn the decision on the grounds that it is better to live with injustice, and wait for 
democratic decision makers to realize the error of their ways, than to risk the collapse of 
our supermajoritarian constitutional order. But are the effects of “judicial updating” really 
so severe as to outweigh the suffering of those Americans who were reduced to second-
class citizenship by the criminal statutes that Lawrence invalidated? What is the conse-
quentialist-minded interpreter to do when confronted with entrenched injustice that is un-
likely ever to be remedied by constitutional amendment? McGinnis and Rappaport offer 
few clues as to how this sort of moral calculus might play out; indeed, they do not seem to 
acknowledge that it is even necessary. 
II. 
If there is one point on which virtually all originalists agree, it is that originalism 
constrains judicial behavior. Compared to rival interpretive approaches, that is, originalism 
purportedly leaves little room for the interpreter to read his or her policy preferences or 
ideological biases into the Constitution. For many well-known originalists, including Jus-
tice Scalia, this attribute alone effectively settles the interpretive debate in favor of original 
meaning.54 But is there any empirical evidence of originalism’s constraining power? 
Frank B. Cross sets out to answer this question in his new study, The Failed Promise 
                                                          
 50. David E. Kyvig, Historical Misunderstandings and the Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment, 18 THE 
PUB. HISTORIAN 51 (1996). 
 51. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 47, 245 n.7 (1986). 
 52. Kyvig, supra note 50, at 53-54. Kyvig notes that Southern opponents of racial integration, including 
Erwin, “raised the specter of mixed-gender public restrooms [as] a not-so-subtle reminder . . . of other recent 
reforms, for which segregated public restrooms had been an important symbol.” Id. at 51. 
 53. See generally CROSS, supra note 1; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 54. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). 
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of Originalism.55 The first challenge that Cross—or anyone attempting a study of original-
ism’s effect on judicial behavior—must confront is that there is no universally accepted 
way of “doing” originalism. Originalists differ among themselves, not only on the question 
of why originalism is normatively superior to its rivals, but also on such critical questions 
as whether the interpreter should be guided by “original intent” or “original public under-
standing” and whether non-originalist precedents should be given any weight in the inter-
pretive process. Given the internecine divisions within the originalist camp, it is reasonable 
to wonder whether it is even possible to specify something called “originalism” that can 
be studied empirically. 
Cross deals with the problem by defining originalism broadly: any constitutional 
interpreter who “grants relatively greater importance to originalist materials and lesser im-
portance to precedent” is considered an originalist for the purposes of his study.56 This 
raises the question of which historical sources should count as “originalist materials.” In 
the end, Cross settles on a list of Founding-era sources consisting of The Federalist, Eliot’s 
Debates, James Madison’s notes on the Constitutional Convention, early dictionaries, and 
the Declaration of Independence.57 He does not claim that these sources do, in fact, reveal 
the original meaning (however defined) of particular textual provisions. Indeed, he con-
tends that these sources are both “incomplete in their coverage” and “of uncertain reliabil-
ity, with records compromised by incompetence or purposeful bias.”58 But originalists 
must derive original meaning from somewhere, and Cross concludes, reasonably enough, 
that extensive reliance on Founding-era sources should be regarded as evidence of 
originalism in action. 
Having arrived at a workable definition, Cross uses a dataset of Supreme Court opin-
ions containing citations to Founding-era sources to quantify originalism’s impact (or lack 
thereof) on the justices’ decisions.59 He is not the first scholar to attempt this sort of anal-
ysis, and his quantitative chapters lack the methodological sophistication of some previous 
efforts. Still, The Failed Promise of Originalism is more comprehensive than prior studies, 
and Cross presents his findings with admirable clarity and candor.60 He is at his best when 
using quantitative evidence to demolish popular myths concerning originalism’s origins. 
Among other things, his analysis makes clear that originalism is a relative newcomer to 
the Court.61 Although the Justices occasionally invoked Founding-era sources in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, they did not begin to do so with regularity until rela-
tively late in the last century. Moreover, he notes that the first signs of an ascendant 
originalism can be detected in Court opinions from the 1950s and 1960s—a discovery that 
                                                          
 55. See generally CROSS, supra note 1. 
 56. Id. at 43.  
 57. Other potential sources, including the records of the early Congresses and Joseph Story’s Commentaries, 
are dismissed because they appeared too late to accurately reflect the original meaning of the text. Id. at 66-67. 
 58. Id. at 67. 
 59. See id. at 141-49; see also id. at 185. 
 60. For previous attempts to quantify the impact of originalist reasoning on judicial decision-making, see 
Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113 (2002); 
Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard, & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Use of 
the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329 (2005); Matthew J. Festa, Dueling Federalists: Supreme Court De-
cisions with Multiple Opinions Citing The Federalist, 1986-2007, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 75 (2007). 
 61. CROSS, supra note 1, at 73. 
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calls into question the widespread belief that modern originalism was born in a reaction 
against the Warren Court’s alleged disregard for original meaning.62 Finally, by examining 
how often individual justices joined or authored opinions citing originalist materials, Cross 
discredits the notion that originalism is a polarizing force on the modern Court. Since the 
beginning of the Warren Court era, he finds no significant “difference among the justices 
in [their use of] originalist sources.”63 Indeed, justices normally identified as foes of 
originalism, including Justice Brennan, seem to have cited Founding-era sources at 
roughly the same rate as self-proclaimed originalists, including Justices Scalia and 
Thomas.64 
Following this descriptive overview of the Court’s use of “originalist materials,” 
Cross proceeds to test two specific hypotheses concerning originalism’s impact on deci-
sion making.65 First, he asks, “whether originalism is intrinsically conservative in ideolog-
ical effect.”66 In other words, are opinions that rely on Founding-era sources more likely 
to reach ideologically conservative results? Relying on Segal and Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme 
Court database to measure opinion ideology, Cross finds little evidence to support this 
hypothesis.67 Citations to Founding-era sources, it turns out, are about as common in ide-
ologically liberal opinions as in conservative ones.68 His second hypothesis weighs the 
relative influence of originalism and ideology on judicial decision-making. More specifi-
cally, do “justices [who] rely on originalist sources . . . tend to reach results consistent with 
their ideological preferences, or are they frequently driven away from such results?”69 
Here again, he finds no evidence that use of originalist sources has significantly impacted 
the justices’ voting behavior. “The ideological results in justices’ opinions using original-
ism,” he concludes, “trace fairly closely the ideological results in opinions not using 
originalism.”70 Justice Scalia, for example, reaches conservative decisions in 75.9% of the 
cases in which he joins an opinion that cites originalist materials—a percentage that is 
almost identical to his overall conservative voting rate of 75.7%.71 Justice Ginsburg, in 
turn, reaches liberal decisions in about 69% of all cases, and in about 74% of cases in 
which she joins an opinion citing Founding-era evidence.72 
What should we make of the fact that reliance on Founding-era sources seems to 
have little impact on the justices’ voting behavior? Does this mean that the justices are 
deliberately manipulating the evidence in order to reach ideologically favorable outcomes? 
Cross is agnostic on this point, but appears to lean toward the view that unconscious “mo-
tivated reasoning,” rather than conscious manipulation of sources, is responsible for the 
lack of consensus in decisions employing originalist evidence.73 The larger point, however, 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 90.  
 63. Id. at 151. 
 64. Id. at 150-51. 
 65. Id. at 176. 
 66. Id. 
 67. The United States Supreme Court database is available at http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php. 
 68. CROSS, supra note 1, at 177. 
 69. Id. at 184. 
 70. Id. at 187. 
 71. Id. at 185. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 165-70. 
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is “that originalism, at least as measured by use of originalist sources, has failed to con-
strain the justices . . . .”74 This is “not because justices ignore [the theory] but instead 
because the originalist sources can be employed for either a liberal or a conservative result 
in the closely contested cases before the Court.”75 
Originalists will no doubt find fault with certain aspects of Cross’s methodology, 
including his expansive definition of originalism. The decision to label any opinion in 
which a Founding-era source is cited an “originalist” opinion may obscure important dif-
ferences between, say, the straightforward textualism of Hugo Black and the more histor-
ically grounded originalism of Justice Scalia. Others may attribute the lack of consensus 
in originalist opinions to judicial incompetence, or else to a rudimentary grasp of original-
ist theory. As originalism becomes more sophisticated, and as justices become more fa-
miliar with the latest scholarship, perhaps we can expect a greater degree of convergence 
in originalist opinions. Still others will point out that justices who employ originalist 
modes of reasoning do not always do so sincerely. Perhaps the lack of consensus in 
originalist opinions does not stem from any flaw in the theory itself, but rather from delib-
erate obfuscation on the part of justices who find the true “original meaning” of particular 
provisions distasteful. 
But despite its at times cursory treatment of potential objections, The Failed Promise 
of Originalism largely succeeds in debunking the notion that originalism is comparatively 
more effective than its rivals at limiting judicial discretion.76 As Cross points out, even if 
one grants the debatable proposition that divergent interpretations of originalist evidence 
should be chalked up to judicial obfuscation—that is, to justices who refuse to accept what 
they know to be the true original meaning of the Constitution—it is not clear how this 
problem can be remedied.77 Consider District of Columbia v. Heller, the controversial 
2008 decision in which a bare majority of the Court ruled that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual right to own a handgun, irrespective of involvement with a state 
militia.78 The sharply conflicting interpretations of the Second Amendment’s “original 
meaning” put forward in Scalia’s majority opinion and Stevens’ dissent cannot both be 
correct. But both are coherently reasoned and well stocked with citations to Founding-era 
sources. If one side or the other was manipulating the evidence—whether consciously or 
unconsciously—it is not clear how this could be conclusively established. Who would ar-
bitrate such a dispute? Cross does not rule out the possibility that “future hypothetical 
justices [may] coalesce[] around one particular theory of originalism and . . . devote[] 
[themselves] to it above all else, [thus] overcom[ing] their [innate] ideological biases.”79 
But the impressive array of evidence marshaled in this study suggests that we would be 
unwise to pin our hopes on such an unlikely development. 
III. 
Cross’s study raises a number of important questions about the larger enterprise of 
                                                          
 74. Id. at 186. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 185-86. 
 77. Id. at 186-87. 
 78. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 79. CROSS, supra note 1, at 194. 
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constitutional theory. If originalism is incapable of constraining judicial behavior, is there 
an alternative theory that can do better? And if not, what is the point of our incessant 
theorizing about the true meaning of the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause? 
Is constitutional theory little more than politics by other means? 
These are big questions that Cross, understandably, does not attempt to answer. For-
tunately, such big questions are the central concern of Mark Graber’s latest book, A New 
Introduction to American Constitutionalism. Graber’s book is a sort of textbook, albeit an 
unconventional one that “aim[s] to teach the teachers of American constitutionalism as 
well as their pupils.”80 In particular, he hopes to broaden the study of constitutionalism to 
cover more than “limits on government action enforced by the Supreme Court.”81 Reduc-
ing the study of constitutionalism to the study of the U.S. Reports, he argues, leaves stu-
dents without the analytical tools to understand vast swaths of the American constitutional 
order. Armed with nothing more than a handful of memorable Supreme Court precedents, 
he asks, how are students to make sense of constitutional questions, such as the debate 
over the extent of the President’s war powers, which are unlikely ever to be considered—
let alone resolved—by the courts? Or, for that matter, how can students who have not been 
trained to think systematically about the relationship between law and politics ever hope 
to make sense of radical shifts in constitutional doctrine? 
He has a point. Most teachers of constitutional law (the present writer included) do 
a poor job of conveying the extent to which constitutional meaning is shaped by forces—
from social movements, to elections, to unwritten norms—that have little to do with case 
law or jurisprudence in the traditional sense. And few casebooks or undergraduate text-
books even attempt to provide a systematic framework for thinking about the relationship 
between constitutional doctrine and the various extra-judicial forces that drive constitu-
tional development. Graber’s book goes a long way towards filing this void. He opens with 
a discussion of constitutional purposes, proceeds through chapters on constitutional inter-
pretation, constitutional authority, and constitutional change, and finally concludes with a 
comparative examination of American constitutionalism. Along the way, he manages to 
synthesize a vast amount of normative and empirical material, and he displays a rare talent 
for simplifying complex arguments without sacrificing nuance. He also has a knack for 
using historical episodes to illustrate the practical stakes of debates that might otherwise 
strike students as hopelessly abstract. 
Graber’s theoretical perspective, as he makes clear at the outset, is best described as 
“historical-institutionalitst.”82 He describes constitutional meaning as emerging from com-
plex interactions among judges, political actors, and ordinary citizens, all of whom operate 
within a political universe structured by inherited norms and institutions.83 If he is quick 
to find fault with scholars who present an idealized portrait of an apolitical judiciary, he is 
equally quick to insist that text, precedent, and other legal considerations set limits to what 
political actors, and the judges they place on the bench, can hope to accomplish. It would 
be naïve, he points out, to pretend that political ideology played no role in the Supreme 
                                                          
 80. MARK A. GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM xii (2013). 
 81. Id. at ix. 
 82. Id. at xi. 
 83. Id. at 13. 
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Court’s 5-4 decision in Bush v. Gore.84 But it would be equally naïve to suggest that a 
Republican legal challenge to the results of the 1996 presidential election could have 
placed Bob Dole in the White House.85 “[P]ersonal values or interests” almost certainly 
influence judicial decision making, he concludes, but only to the extent that they “can be 
incorporated by legal means.”86 
The chapter on constitutional interpretation is a particular highlight. Here, Graber 
pulls off the remarkable feat of summarizing the major theoretical approaches in a style 
that is both concise and accessible. The discussion is admirably evenhanded, and effec-
tively highlights the strengths and weaknesses of originalist, aspirational, structural, prag-
matic (or prudential) and doctrinal approaches. Although originalism is not singled out for 
special criticism, one senses that more rigid forms of originalism are difficult to reconcile 
with historical-institutionalism. Simply put, the notion that the true meaning of a constitu-
tional provision is frozen at the time of ratification sits uneasily beside the historical-insti-
tutionalist’s awareness that constitutional principles have historically evolved in tandem 
with underlying structures of political authority. For example, Graber rightly notes that 
“judicial decisions, federal laws, presidential proclamations, and underlying political 
movements” have effected far more constitutional change than Article V amendments over 
the course of American history.87 He points out, moreover, that “whenever partisan coali-
tions have acquired relatively durable control over all national institutions”—as occurred 
in the 1830s, the 1860s, and the 1930s—“their constitutional vision has become the law of 
the land.”88 This is not to suggest that this type of “semiformal” constitutional change must 
necessarily be viewed as legitimate. But Graber is no doubt correct to claim that such 
change is hardwired in the structure of our constitutional order. Normative theorists who 
ignore this basic fact of American constitutional development, he suggests, do so at their 
peril. 
Ultimately, however, Graber is less interested in pointing out flaws in particular in-
terpretive theories than in critiquing the broader enterprise of constitutional theory. He 
urges theorists to examine not only the ways in which constitutions constrain political ac-
tors through the mechanism of judicial review, but also the ways in which they construct 
politics and constitute citizens. When a constitutional order flourishes, he points out, it is 
typically not because judges or political actors have managed to constrain official power 
by reasoning their way to a single, normatively best way of reading the constitutional text. 
Rather, it is because the constitution has facilitated the internalization of broadly shared 
norms and fostered a constitutional politics that “aggregate[es] existing interests, values, 
and policy preferences in ways that privilege constitutionally desirable outcomes.”89 Con-
versely, when a constitutional order disintegrates, it is typically not because of interpretive 
disagreement alone, but rather because the norms and political mechanisms that once fa-
cilitated peaceful dispute resolution have broken down – as in the slavery crisis of the 
                                                          
 84. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 218. 
 87. Id. at 161. 
 88. Id. at 153. 
 89. Id. at 219; see id. at 231. 
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1850s. Viewed from this perspective, it seems clear that the stakes of interpretive disa-
greement are somewhat lower than originalists (and their critics) want to claim. For all its 
flaws, originalism is not the root cause of dysfunction in our constitutional order; but nei-
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